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Foreclosure of Securitized Commercial Mortgages
- A Model of the Special Servicer
Abstract
The decision to foreclose on a CMBS mortgage is made by the special servicer. A mortgage
loan is in special servicing when it is either delinquent or in a state of imminent default. A
special servicer should represent the interests of the underlying CMBS bondholders by returning
the highest possible value to the investors. In this paper, we show that a special servicer's
compensation structure results in an incentive for her to extend a loan beyond the time desired
by its bondholders. We develop a model and demonstrate how compensation incentives interact
and inuence a special servicer's foreclosure decisions. Our model takes into consideration the
dynamic nature of such a decision by viewing is as a dynamic programming problem whereby
foreclosure represents a discrete terminal state of an optimal stopping problem. This model thus
captures the trade-o between continuation of a loan and termination and we use this model to
determine how the stopping rule changes under various compensation structures.
Keywords: CMBS, Special Servicer, Foreclosure, Optimal Contract Design,
First-loss Bond.
1. Introduction
Following the recent collapse of the subprime mortgage market, there is widespread concern that
the next wave of defaults will occur in the Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS) sec-
tor. With lax underwriting being the primary cause behind the high level of subprime mortgage
defaults, a similar claim can be made about commercial mortgages that originated at the same
time. During that period, loan underwritings were based on optimistic projections of future
cash ow as opposed to typical cash ows, which had been common in the past. Many of
these so-called \proforma loans" were structured as interest-only loans preventing the borrower
from accumulating equity through amortization. These eects, taken together, may explain the
steady increase in the rate of loan delinquencies we're observing today.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 1 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
With shortened balloon maturity dates of recent issuances and tighter credit markets, the
inability of borrowers to renance may also lead to defaults. Figure 1 plots the maturing
balances of CMBS loans, broken down by year of origination. We see that, in 2011 and 2012,
approximately $39 billion and $50 billion in loans will come due, respectively. If the present
tight lending environment persists over the next three years, we may see a sizable number of such
maturity defaults. Figure 2 shows that the number of CMBS loans that have been transferred
to special servicers has been increasing since 2007. According to Trepp, as of January 31, 2011,
distressed CMBS loans that are currently under special servicing have reached 13:40% of the
CMBS market.1
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 2 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
While gure 2 indicates a potential looming problem, it is important to note that actual
foreclosure decisions regarding CMBS loans are made by an entity called the special servicer. A
special servicer has considerable discretion in deciding how she manages a distressed mortgage.
1Commercial Mortgage Alert 2009, 2010.
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Her actions may range from making advances for any debt service shortfalls to traditional loan
workout strategies such as loan write-downs or loan modications. Since a special servicer is
compensated by a periodic fee along with other revenue sources for the period during which she
is actively managing a loan, any actual foreclosure decision represents the termination of her
compensation. This indicates that such a decision will likely involve a trade-o between retaining
the compensation stream and realizing the benets associated with mortgage termination.
The ability to postpone a foreclosure date, sometimes by as much as three years, suggests that
whether a future wave of anticipated foreclosures will occur depends on the actions of the special
servicers. Given the conict between receiving income streams from postponing foreclosure and
serving the needs of all bondholders, understanding this trade-o is an important step towards
being able to assess the potential severity of a new CMBS loan default. Thus eective analysis
of the potential CMBS default problem hinges on understanding how special servicers make
foreclosure decisions and how such decisions are inuenced by the various incentives that result
from their sources of compensation.
These relationships are further complicated by the fact that most special servicers retain
the rst-loss bonds from the CMBS structures of loans that they are managing. Furthermore,
special servicers usually have the right of rst refusal to purchase defaulted loans at a price that
is determined by the special very same servicers. Gan and Mayer 2007 report that, among CMBS
deals that special servicers manage, 64% contain some portion of rst-loss bonds held by special
servicers. Holding such rst-loss securities makes them essentially equity investors so foreclosure
decisions apparently align more closely with the interests of the below-investment-grade CMBS
bondholders rather than with those of the senior bondholders. Senior bondholders in general
prefer that a property be sold quickly since they are the rst to receive liquidation proceeds.
In contrast, the below-investment-grade bond investors wish to postpone liquidation since any
principal losses will immediately impact their bonds. With special servicers holding the riskiest
of the below-investment-grade bonds, this may skew their decisions to postpone foreclosure at
the expense of the senior bondholders.
In this paper, we provide a model of the special servicer and outline how these varying
compensation structures inuence foreclosure decisions. Our model captures the dynamic nature
of such decisions whereby a special servicer must continuously evaluate the trade-o between
keeping a loan alive with advances and foreclosing on the loan in an environment of changing
and uncertain future market conditions. While numerous empirical studies have estimated the
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factors leading to CMBS loan default, fewer have modeled the actual foreclosure decision.2
2. Loans in Special Servicing
As of the end of December, 2010, more than $88:4 billion in loans, or 13:20% of all conduit
loans by balance, had been submitted to special servicing. Sixteen companies serve as special
servicers with the largest special servicer, LNR Partners, managing 1; 275 loans valued at more
than $24 billion. Table 1 displays information on the numbers and sizes of loans managed by
each of the special servicers.
Table 1: CMBS Loans in Special Servicing by Servicers
Special Servicer # of Loans Balance of Loans ($Mil.)
LNR Partners, Inc. 1; 275 24; 340
CW Capital Asset Management 968 18; 581
C-III Asset Management LLC 725 10; 470
Midland 517 8; 060
JE Roberts 311 4; 958
Helios AMC, LLC 207 3; 828
Torchlight Loan Services, LLC 173 2; 840
Berkadia 295 1; 795
Orix 102 850
NCB,FSB 12 171
Prudential 14 54
GMAC 13 41
Wells Fargo 10 42
GE Capital 2 11
Lend Lease 3 5
KeyBank 2 7
Source: JP Morgan CMBS Research, as of January 28, 2011
2For empirical default studies, see Ambrose and Sanders (2003), Ciochetti, Deng, Gao, and Yao
(2002), Chen and Deng (2010), Vandell et al. (1993), and Lebret and Quan (2008). For models of special
servicers, see Ambrose, Sanders, and Yavas (2010) and Gan and Mayer (2007).
4
To get a sense of the characteristics of loans that are in special servicing, Table 2 provides
the number of loans and the percentage of the total loan balance by loan vintage. We see that
66:2% of loans held by special servicers originated in 2006 and 2007. This is consistent with the
belief that the underwriting quality for these loans was poor during this period, the same period
during which similarly lax standards were used to originate subprime mortgages.
Table 2: CMBS Loans in Special Servicing by Vintage
Deal Vintage # of Loans Balance % by Balance
1996 9 43; 421; 969 0:0%
1997 18 45; 534; 282 0:1%
1998 90 608; 943; 223 0:8%
1999 150 942; 958; 219 1:2%
2000 290 1; 623; 004; 826 2:1%
2001 266 1; 684; 797; 430 2:2%
2002 155 1; 184; 482; 166 1:6%
2003 191 1; 976; 135; 193 2:6%
2004 339 3; 658; 197; 282 4:8%
2005 764 12; 534; 491; 024 16:5%
2006 1; 089 17; 615; 967; 319 23:1%
2007 1; 178 32; 829; 612; 917 43:1%
2008 80 1; 367; 874; 607 1:8%
Source: JP Morgan, CMBS Research, as of January 28, 2011.
Table 3 categorizes distressed mortgages under special servicing into groups according to
collateral property type. The third column lists percentages of CMBS loan balances that have
been transferred to special servicers by collateralized property type. It shows that the sectors
that have been hardest hit by distressed loans are lodging (21:7%) and multi-family (19:2%)
sectors . This is not surprising because the recent recession of 2008-2009 has hit the hotel
industry (as well as apartment) revenue more quickly due to the lack of long-term leases. The
fourth column lists the shares of specially serviced loan by property type. Given that retail
dominates the CMBS sector, it takes the largest share of total specially-serviced loans (26:0%).
Table 3: CMBS Loans in Special Servicing by Property Types
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Percentage of Balance Percentage of Special
Property Type Balance ($Mil.) in Special Servicing Servicing by Balance
Oce 23; 035:6 11:4% 26:0%
Multi-family 18; 631:5 19:2% 21:1%
Retail 17; 939:2 9:1% 20::3%
Lodging 13; 739:0 21:7% 15:5%
Industrial 2; 752:6 8:4% 3:1%
Other 12; 344:9 16:2% 14:0%
Total 88; 443:1 13:2% 100:0%
Source: Commercial Mortgage Alert, as of January 28, 2011.
2.1. Special Servicers' Decisions
When loans are in delinquency or in a state of imminent default, master servicers transfer them
to special servicers who are responsible for managing and possibly modifying the troubled loans.
Once a loan is in the hands of a special servicer, there are numerous actions she can take:
1. Maturity Date Extensions - Although loan extensions were quite rare prior to 2008, recent
turmoil in credit markets have left many borrowers unable to renance their mortgages to
meet looming loan payments. Typical extensions range from 12 to 36 months, depending
on the special servicer's assessment of a property's income-generating potential and the
credit worthiness of the borrower.
2. Payment Modication - If there is insucient property income to meet the scheduled debt
service, the special servicer may reduce the payments for a dened period. This is a fairly
popular type of restructuring.
3. Reduction in Interest Rates - Much like payment modication, the loan rate may be
reduced if such a reduction can lead to payments that are manageable given the property's
income.
4. Reduction in Principal Balance - This option is the most costly to the special servicer, who
holds the rst-loss bond from the CMBS structure. This is used only when other payment
reduction strategies do not work. In some cases, the borrower will have to contribute
additional funds to oset the principal reduction.
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5. Discounted Payos - This option is used if the borrower has the ability to pay o the
loan at the discounted value and it is not anticipated that property values will increase
in the near future. This may have tax implications since such discounts may be viewed
as discharging debt. A more tax ecient approach would be for the borrower to purchase
the note at the discounted value.
6. Short Sales - This occurs when there is a potential buyer who is willing to purchase at a
reduced price for the note. The loan is written down to a level that is acceptable to the
new buyer, who assumes the loan upon sale.
7. Additional Capital Injection - The special servicer may require the borrower to contribute
additional capital to avoid foreclosure.
8. A/B Split Note - The loan is split into two notes, with the A note equalling the amount
of the loan that can be supported by the current property income. The B note is the
dierence between the loan amount and the size of the A note. This note is due at the
time of maturity so there is a possibility that it may be paid.
2.2. Compensation Structure in Special Servicing
The compensation structure that governs relationships among various participants in a CMBS
deal is an important part of the Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA). Although a special
servicer's role is to represent the interests of all CMBS bondholders, her sources of compensation
may lead her to adopt foreclosure rules that conict with the bondholders' interests. Special
servicers are typically paid a xed fee of 2 basis points of the balance each month. Furthermore,
although this structure was originally proposed as a mechanism for ensuring the special servicers
would minimize losses from managing these loans, they often hold the rst-loss bonds from the
CMBS structure that contains the loan under special servicing. The rationale for this is that any
premature losses from poor loan management will result directly in losses incurred from holding
the rst-loss bonds. If a loan becomes current and is returned to the a master servicer, the
associated special servicer will be rewarded 1% of the loan balance. The special servicer is also
paid 1% of the proceeds from liquidation. In addition, the special servicer is paid a percentage
of funds she is able to extract from the borrower. The special servicer should also have the
ability to make advances to the bondholders if there is a shortfall in debt service payments.
This advance is recovered from either the proceeds from a sale or from the borrower if the loan
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is cured and becomes current. Such an advances have the rst priority to be reimbursed before
even the most senior bond holders get paid.
3. The Model
A special servicer's optimal servicing decision is modeled as a dynamic programming problem
(Rust,1987). The model captures the regenerative intertemporal trade-o decision faced by the
servicer. At each point in time, she determines the value of continuing to service the loan and
being compensated and weights this against the decision to foreclose on the property. The
regenerative nature of her decision reects the fact that postponing will allow her to make the
same decision in the next period. What changes each period is the income-generating abilities
of the property, which we take to be a stochastic process. The solution to this problem, which
is captured by the Bellman equations, yields a cut-o point of property's net operating income
(NOI) which determines her default decision.
Every month, the special servicer makes a decision about whether to foreclose or continue
into the next month. Foreclosing a loan terminates the option of working out the loan in the
next period. If the special servicer chooses to continue, she can employ one or more workout
strategies to modify the loan as previously outlined. The special servicer keeps the option of
foreclosing on the loan in the next or future periods if the loan continues to underperform.
Figure 3 illustrates the special servicer's decision process.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 3 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
A special servicer's optimal decision can be summarized as being determined by the critical
cut-o level of a property's NOI whereby she forecloses if the property's NOI is above this
threshold level. We are interested in understanding how this critical value diers if she holds
a rst-loss bond. The decision rules discussed above dier for each loan and change over time
according to market conditions and property characteristics.
Assume that a borrower's NOI follows a rst-order autoregressive AR (1) process:
NOIt+1 = + NOIt + et (3.1)
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where  is a constant mean;  2 (0; 1) is an autoregressive parameter, and et is the error
term, which follows a standard normal distribution with constant variance 2. Let the initial
stabilized NOI at loan origination be NOI0, and the going-in capitalization rate be Cap0. The
lender's underwriting criteria can be summarized by two variables: the maximum loan-to-value
ratio (LTV0) and the minimum debt service coverage ratio (DSCR0). The CMBS deal contains
two innitely-lived tranches3: a senior tranche and a subordination tranche (rst-loss bond) with
the same coupon rate R0
4. Assuming that the CMBS loan was issued at the binding constraints,
the maximum loan amount at origination is determined by the periodic stabilized NOI that the
underlying property generates. The advantage of this assumption is that it makes the mortgage
scalable, so the loan amount is a constant multiple of stabilized NOI at origination.
L = NOI0 where  = min

LTV0
Cap0
;
1
DSCR0 R0

(3.2)
The optimal stopping rule is the solution to a stochastic dynamic programming problem
that formalizes the trade-o between the conicting objectives of maximizing a special servicer's
income for continuation of a workout and maximizing the liquidation value of the property. The
idea is to explain the joint stochastic processes fi;Xtg ; where fitg is a set of binary-valued
processes: it = 1 if the special servicer forecloses the property, and 0 otherwise. fXtg is a vector
of state variables observed by both the special servicer and us, the model builders. We choose
the cumulative advances as the state variable Xt in our model. The cumulative advances, which
is dened as the total advances the servicer has made since the servicing transfer event, are
determined by many factors such as macroeconomic conditions, loan performance history, loan
terms, and collateral information. The vector f"tg represents the latent variables observed only
by the servicer but not by us.5 The hypothesis we maintain is that the special servicing follows
an intertemporal optimal strategy.
It can be shown that the stochastic process governing fXt; "tg is the solution to the following
3We later relax this assumption by assuming the holdings of the rst-loss pieces decrease over time.
4Normally the coupon rate of a subordination bond is higher than that of the senior tranche. However,
making the interest rates of the two tranches the same does not aect the main result.
5The error term can be interpreted as special servicer's heterogeneity. For example, if a special
servicer chooses to hedge her rst-loss holdings by entering into swap contracts, her workout strategy
will be dierent from that of those who have market exposure to rst-bond price risks. For discussion of
dierent interpretation and model techniques of the error terms, please see Rust 1992.
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value function:
V (Xt; "t) = sup

E
8<:
1X
j=1
(j t) [u (xj ; fj ; 1) + "j (fj)] jxt;"t; 2; 3
9=; (3.3)
where the servicer chooses a sequence of decision rules ft (xt; "t; ) to maximize her expected
discounted utility function over an innite horizon,  = fft; ft+1; ft+2; :::g ;with  being her
intertemporal rate of time preference.
The optimal value function v is the unique solution to the following Bellman's equation:
v (xt; "t) = max
i2C(xt)
[u (xt; i; 1) + "t (i) + Ev (xt; "t; i)] (3.4)
The realized single-period utility of decision i when state variable is (xt; "t) can be written
as:
u (xt; i; 1) + "i (i)
=
 s1L+ bLR0 Zt+"t (0) ; it= 0 continue
s2Vt+
tP
j=1
Zj (1 +R1)
t j +max (0; Vt   (1  b)L) Y (Xt)+"t (1) ; it= 1 foreclose
(3.5)
Each month, the servicer faces a discrete decision about whether to continue monitoring
the loan or to foreclose on the property. If she chooses to continue, she receives a constant
monthly servicing fee of s1: She makes an advance if the realized NOI is smaller than the
scheduled monthly payment. The periodic advance, including principal and interest payable to
bond holder in addition to servicing advances, is dened in terms of the incremental changes in
the observed state variable fXg ; Zt = Xt  Xt 1.
In addition to servicing income and expenses, the servicer receives payment from holding
the subordination or rst-loss bond. The servicer receives interest income bLR0 where b is the
proportion of all subordination bonds that she holds. When the loan becomes performing again
(NOIs are higher than debt service for a certain period), the loan is sent back to the master
servicer. If the special servicer chooses to foreclose on the loan, all advances the special servicer
has made since the transfer event will be reimbursed with interests,
tP
j=1
Zj (1 +R1)
t j , before the
proceeds are distributed to bond holders: In addition, the special servicer receives a liquidation
fee, s2Vt , expressed as a percentage of the property liquidation value Vt after it pays out to
other senior bond holders if its principal is not wiped out, max (0; Vt   (1  b)L). The property
liquidation value can be derived as the last period NOI capitalized at the terminal cap rate,
RT ; i.e. Vt =
NOIt
RT
: Brown, Ciocheti, and Riddiough (2006) suggest that depressed industry
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conditions will drive a wedge between the fundamental asset value and the asset sale price.
Therefore the terminal cap rate is assumed to be higher than the going-in cap rate. In addition,
Y (Xt) captures the disutility (or penalty) a special servicer suers if she has been working with
the distressed loan for a signicantly long period. Y (Xt) is modeled as negatively related to the
cumulative advancement Xt: As for the same-revenue incentive, the longer a distressed loan has
been in the special servicer's house, the bigger the reputational penalty it will incur if she does
not achieve a successful workout.
The special servicer's utility for a successful workout or loan modication is
u (xt; 1) = s3L+ bLR0 +
tX
j=1
Zj (1 +R1)
t j ; (3.6)
which is the utility of one possible terminal state exogenously specied.
A loan is sent back to the master servicer when its current NOIt exceeds the stabilized NOI
determined at loan origination plus an extra amount, which is modeled as an increasing function
of the cumulative advances; that is, NOIt > NOI0+kXt:The proceeds a special servicer receives
include a workout fee s3L
6, interest payment bLR0 from the rst-loss bonds she holds, and the
reimbursement of total advances made with compounded interest.7
4. Results
We calibrate our model parameters and estimate any behavior biases as a consequence of special
servicer compensation. We particularly focus on investigating the inuence of the servicer hold-
ing rst-loss bonds. The data-generating process can be regarded as realization of a controlled
Markov process generated from the solution to the innite horizon stochastic control problem.
The estimation in this paper is based on simulations. The parameter values of the base scenario
are shown in table 4, and the value function is approximated using nested xed point algorithm.
6Under current special servicing industry practice, the workout fee is the same as the amount of fees
received if a special servicer forecloses on a loan.
7Note equation 3.6 does not have an error term, because it is one of the possible results from a decision
to continue. Modeling all possible loan modications is not tractable.
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Table 4 Parameter Values of the Base Scenario
Baseline Scenario Parameter Value
Loan-to-Value Ratio (LTV0) 0:7
Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR0) 1:4
Capitalization Rate (Annual) (Cap0) 9%
Subordination Tranche Coupon Rate (R0) 10%
Reimbursement Interest Rate (Annual) (R1) 7%
Intertemporal Rate of Substitution () 0:992
Stabilized NOI (Monthly) (NOI0) 10
Volatility (Standard Deviation) of NOI 3
Autoregressive Parameter () 0:7
Portion of First-loss Bond Holding (b) 0:2%  2%
Compensations of the Special Servicer
Fixed (Monthly) Special Servicing Fee (s1) 2 bps
Foreclosure Fee (s2) 1%
Workout Fee (s3) 1%
The objective of this study is to quantify the magnitude of foreclosure bias in terms of NOI
threshold. The foreclosure NOI cut-o point is the result of the optimal decision of a special
servicer based on current realization of cash ow (NOIt) and cumulative advances (Xt) made
since the servicing transfer event:The special servicer is essentially making an optimal stopping
(foreclosure) decision to exercise the workout option. The option value of continued workout
is the central feature of the model. By extending the specially serviced loan into the next
period, the servicer preserves the option of workout or later liquidation. Holding a portion of
the subordination bonds typically provides her with a stronger incentive to postpone foreclosure.
We dene foreclosure bias as the percentage dierence in the foreclosure thresholds of a
special servicer who holds a rst-loss piece and one who does not hold a rst-loss piece. Let
NOI (NOI) be the foreclosure thresholds for the special servicer who holds (does not hold)
rst-loss bonds. We thus measure foreclosure bias as the percentage dierence between NOI
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and NOI; normalized by initial cash ow NOI08.
Foreclosure Bias =
NOI  NOI
NOI0
(4.1)
4.1. Foreclosure Bias When the Special Servicer Holds First-loss Bonds
Figure 4 provides simulated regions for continuation, foreclosure, and workout decisions on the
part of a special servicer. Two axes represent two observable state variables (realized NOI and
cumulative advances) in our model. The vertical axis represents the NOI realization state and
the horizontal axis is cumulative advances Xt, measured by the number of months
9 after the
special servicing transfer event. These area plots can be interpreted as a map of optimal workout
strategies resulting from the special servicer's dynamic programming problem. Any point on the
map, which gives a special servicer an optimal workout decision, results from two state variables:
1) the current NOI level, and 2) the special servicing severity (cumulative advances made by the
special servicer measured in number of months in special servicing).
The four panels in gure 4 demonstrate four scenarios corresponding to a range of optimal
workout strategies according to various rst-loss bond holding percentages when a delinquent
loan was transferred to a special servicer (b ranges from 0 to 2 percent). The white area
represents the workout region, where sucient NOIs made the loan performing and current
and the specially serviced loan has been returned to the master servicer. The criteria for a
successful workout is exogenously specied as NOI returns to the stabilized NOI level, which
is modeled as an increasing function of special servicing severity to capture the fact that a
deeply distressed loan should achieved a higher NOI before being returned to a master servicer.
The dark area represents the foreclosure region where a special servicer's optimal decision is to
foreclose on the property. The gray area at the bottom of the graph is the continuation region.
The border line between the foreclosure region and the continuation region is the foreclosure
NOI threshold. If the NOI is lower than the border line, the special servicer will choose to
postpone the foreclosure. Because low net operating income means poor liquidation value, the
option of foreclosure is deeply out of the money.
8We choose the initial NOI0 level to normalize foreclosure bias rather than NOI
; because NOI itself is a
random variable and it can vary dramatically according to state realizations, which makes the normalized
bias unstable.
9The severity of special servicing can be measured in terms of the number of months under special
servicing by assuming that the incremental advance equals the total monthly debt payment.
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||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 4 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
We are particularly interested in understanding how a special servicer's rst-loss holdings
bias her foreclosure decisions. It is apparent from gure 4 that the continuation region (or the
number of states that are involved in extending the foreclosures) increases when the rst-loss
bond holding rises from no-holding to a 2% holding. The marginal changes in foreclosing NOI
levels reect the discrepancy in foreclosure decisions for a special servicer who holds rst-loss
bonds. In order to identify the foreclosure bias, gure 5 summarizes the information from gure
4 and shows this foreclosure bias at various special servicing periods. The optimal foreclosure
threshold can be 50% higher for servicers who hold rst-loss bonds than for those who do not
hold such bonds. The dotted line represents the case in which the servicer holds only 0:2%
of the rst-loss bonds. The dashed line represents a rst-loss bond holding of 0:5% while the
solid line represents a holding of 2%. Figure 5 shows signicant bias ranging from zero to 50%.
The gap is higher when the cumulative advances are larger. (A larger rst-loss bond holding
yields higher foreclosure bias.) A continually underperforming property causes continuously
rising advances. As a result, the likelihood that it will generate sucient income to cover debt
service payments declines. As this process continues, the foreclosure bias decreases until the
bias is eliminated. That is, as more and more advances are made, the likelihood of recovering
these advances diminishes to the point where the special servicer's foreclosure decision would be
identical to that of a servicer who does not hold rst-loss bonds.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 5 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
4.2. Robustness Checks
Our results are robust under various parameter specications. The foreclosure biases are both
statistically and economically signicant under various NOI processes and various CMBS un-
derwriting standards (LTV, DSCR, R0, R1 etc.). In this section, we exam whether the current
practices of \delay and pray" or \pretend and extend" are due to a dramatic change in mar-
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ket fundamentals. The second hypothesis addresses the argument that rst-loss bonds held by
special servicers have been under water or deteriorating.
4.2.1. Foreclosure Bias When Market Fundamentals Change
The record-high numbers of CMBS loans in distress are coupled with dramatic changes in nan-
cial market fundamentals. Can changes in market fundamentals alone explain the systematic
biases of the special servicer's foreclosure decision? How much foreclosure bias is due to changes
in market fundamentals and how much is attributable to the special servicer's holding of rst-
loss bonds? This section investigates this question by assuming a structural shift in the market
capitalization rate. The cap rate is the market average rate used to capitalize the stabilized NOI
to determine the asset value. Now let's assume the occurrence a permanent shock to the econ-
omy and examine how market value cash ows10. In particular, we assume that the expected
average cap rate permanently increases from 9% to 12% after loan underwriting.
Figure 6 compares the excess delays in foreclosures following cap rate increases under various
rst-loss bond holdings, ranging from zero to one percent. The percentage changes in the
foreclosure threshold are calculated as percentage dierences in NOI cuto points. The dotted
line of zero rst-loss holding in gure 6 shows that the extended delays are expected for distressed
loans that are newly transferred and for loans that have stayed in special servicing for longer
periods. For loans that are in special servicing for 15 to 28 months, special servicers tend to
foreclosure sooner, because they no longer expect market conditions to improve signicantly in
the near future and foreclose quickly to recover as much value as possible. The U-shaped pattern
becomes pronounced as the percentage of rst-loss holdings increases. To estimate the overall
or cumulative eect of such a cap rate change, we measure the likelihood of the continuation
region weighted by state probability, because the distribution of NOI realization is not uniform
(the realization probability of NOI = 9; is much higher than that of NOI = 3; for example).
However correctly assigning the NOI probability distribution is non-trivial, as a loan that has
been in special servicing for 10 months of is conditional on the fact that it has been with the
special servicer for 9 months. To facilitate faster calibration, we use stationary distribution of
AR (1) for the NOI process. Therefore, the resulting measure of excess delays in foreclosures
under-estimates true extension bias.
10This may be due to changes in people's perception of risk or valuation of risks.
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||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 6 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Three curves in gure 7 conrm the intuition that a permanent negative shock in market
fundamentals causes special servicers to postpone foreclosure. However, this eect produces only
a limited bias of under 0:5% for loans that are in special servicing for more than 8 months if
the special servicer holds no rst-loss piece. The market fundamental eect plays a much more
important role when a special servicer holds rst-loss pieces. If a special servicer holds 0:5%
and 1% of rst-loss bonds, the excess delay could be as high as 75% and 30%; respectively. We
conclude that such a rst-loss holding causes a special servicer to delay foreclosure substantially
in response to a permanent change in market fundamentals.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 7 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
4.2.2. Foreclosure Bias When a Special Servicer's First-loss Bond Holdings
Decrease
The results for the base model build on the assumption that the shares in rst-loss pieces that a
special servicer holds remain constant during the special servicing periods. As loan performance
deteriorates, a special servicer's rst-loss holding may decrease or even be wiped out entirely.
To estimate the impact of such deteriorating eects, we compare the constant holding with
diminishing holding for foreclosure biases of 0:5% initial rst-loss bond holdings. Figure 8 shows
that the foreclosure bias remains signicant. For loans that are in special servicing under 15
months, the biases are the same. It is only when the rst-loss holdings are reduced to almost
zero that the foreclose bias starts to narrow.
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
Figure 8 here
||||||||||||||||||||||||{
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5. Conclusion and Implications for CMBS Contract Design
Conicts of interest between senior bond holders and junior bond holders as well as the \self-
dealing" problem regarding special servicers raise a bigger question about optimal contract
design of CMBS deals. The record high level of defaults and the temporary suspension of
CMBS issuance during 2008-2009 provide challenges as well as opportunities for CMBS design.
We proxy the self-dealing problem for using the rst-loss bond ownership and the conict between
compensation structures. We demonstrate how a special servicer, when she holds rst-loss bonds
from the structure that contains the nonperforming loans she is managing, might postpone the
foreclosure decision. Thus our model illustrates the current industry practice of \Delay and
Pray" or \Extend and Pretend". We show that the more subordination bonds a special servicer
holds, the more inclined she is to postpone the foreclosure decision. However, this workout
behavior skews the decision only up to a point, after which the servicer reverts back to an
unbiased foreclosure rule.
Governed by the pooling and servicing agreement, a special servicer should maximize the
total recovery of all CMBS bonds on a present value basis. We show that since most special
servicers are also investors in or appointed by the controlling class (rst-loss bond investors),
their foreclosure decisions regarding specially serviced loans might be biased. Our dynamic
programming model attempts to quantify this bias, which can be as high as 50 percent, in terms
of optimal NOI foreclosing threshold.
Based on our model, we oer the following recommendations11 for optimal design of CMBS
service contracts: (1) Special servicers should not be granted the rst-refusal option to pur-
chase defaulted loans; they should buy the defaulted loans in a competitive market; (2) the
re-appointment of a special servicer should be made by an independent entity that would repre-
sent the whole trust; (3) fees paid to special servicers should be capped or shared by the trust;
(4) total advances should be restricted to a certain percentage of asset market value.
11Some of the recommendations are consistent with the recent CMBS deal - the $788.5 million GS
Mortgage Securities Trust 2010-C1, backed by commercial mortgages contributed by Goldman Sachs,
Citi and Starwood Property Trust. In this deal, where Wells Fargo was appointed master and special
servicer, a cap was put on special servicer fees for loan workout. The replacement of the special servicer
will be determined by the a majority vote; no single bond class will have the right to replace the special
servicer. In addition, the deal eliminated the traditional option for the special servicer to buy defaulted
loans. Instead, loans have to be marketed and sold to the highest bidders.
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Figure 3: Decision Tree of a Typical Special Servicer 
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